Isolationism

After reading the articles below, answer the following questions and comment on your peers comments:
1. Define isolationism.
2. How did isolationism effect our involvement in World War II?
3. What are the issues with isolationism? Is it an effective policy today?

A Warning on Isolationism

Wendell Willkie
January 8, 1941
Delivered January 8, 1941 before the Women’s National Republican Club
Hotel Astor, New York City
Mrs. Hays, members of the Women’s National Republican Club, I am delighted to be here, not alone as the last candidate on the Republican ticket for President of the United States, but also to thank each one of you personally for what you did in that crusade which we conducted just before Nov. 5. There is considerable solace in defeat. Not long ago I was reading the autobiography of Henry Watterson, that sparkling editor of The Louisville Courier-Journal. His father was a Congressman prior to the Civil War, and Henry spent much of his time in Washington with his father and was a great friend of many notables, among whom his greatest friend was Stephen Arnold Douglas who, as you know, was an outstanding leader in American public life.
The boys were sitting around the table one night, perhaps imbibing more than they should, and one of them said, "What do you think has happened—Steve Douglas wants to be President of the United States." Another spoke up, "Well, if Steve Douglas wants to be President we will have to go out and work for him. But I don’t for the life of me know why he wants to be President at 44 years of age and have to be good for the rest of his life."
The American people relieved me of the necessity of being good for the balance of my life.
I am greatly concerned about the Republican party—because in my judgment it is the only political organization in the United States today that can possibly ultimately bring back to the American people those principles that made this government great. It is the only political organization in the United States that can possibly restore to this country the system of free enterprise and individual liberty which transposed this country from a wilderness to the greatest industrial nation with a higher standard of living than that of any other country in the world and which offers over a period of years, when the rewards of this system are more widely diffused among the people, the ultimate hope of mankind for liberty and well-being.
And my concern about the Republican party and its place in this country is such that instead of speaking mere pleasantries to you I decided to speak to you very frankly of what I believe should be the Republican party’s position in this most critical moment in the Iong and magnificent history of liberty. I do not presume to speak for all in the party; I speak as Wendell Willkie to you fellow-Republicans saying what is in my heart and what I think will ultimately bring the Republican party to full power in the American system of government.
Whether we like it or not America cannot remove itself from the world. Every development in the art of transportation, every development in the art of communication has reduced the size of the world so that the world today actually is no larger than the thirteen original colonies were when we established our system of liberty in the United States. And much as we would like to withdraw within ourselves and much as we would like to disregard the rest of the world—we cannot. ’We cannot be indifferent to what happens in Europe. We cannot forget the fighting men of Britain. They are defending our liberty as well as theirs.
If they are permitted to fail I say to you quite deliberately that I do not believe liberty can survive here. I take issue with all who say we can survive with freedom in a totalitarian world.
I want to say to you even though some of you may disagree with me, and I say it to you with all the emphasis of my being, that if Britain falls before the onslaught of Hitlerism, it will be impossible over a period of time to preserve the free way of life in America.
There has been a bill introduced in Congress to give the President quite extraordinary power to deal with the present crisis, and as I said last Sunday, this bill must be modified in several respects and particularly in one—the extraordinary power granted must automatically come back to the people on a definite date.
I have listened this afternoon to the suggestions of Jim Wadsworth with whom, whether or not you all agree, you must say of him that of all the men in public life he has most consistently stood for what he believes, irrespective of the consequences. I have listened to some of his suggested amendments and I think they are wise suggestions to consider. I have also reviewed the suggestion of Kenneth Simpson, member of Congress from New York, and I think his suggestions are wise ones.
But let me say to you that if the Republican party in the year of 1941 makes a blind opposition to this bill and allows itself to be presented to the American people as the isolationist party, it will never again gain control of the American government. I beg of you—I plead with you—you people who believe as I do in our great system of government—please do not in blind opposition—do not because of hate of an individual—and of all persons in the United States I have least cause to hold a brief for him—forget the critical world situation which confronts us and in which America is a part.
We are fortunate to be represented in Congress—we Republicans—by very able and outstanding men. It is their duty and if I have any persuasive ability with them, I beg of them to debate and consider the bill and each of its provisions carefully. I urge you likewise to call upon them to examine the bill with utmost scrutiny and debate it thoroughly but in the final analysis after justifiable criticism urge them not to vote to render America or its Chief Executive impotent to preserve liberty in Britain—not alone because we are sympathetic with Britain’s economic, social and cultural way of life but primarily because in her preservation of that way of life the hope of preserving it in America will be assured.
May I say to you as my considered judgment that America will not stay out of the war merely by persons asserting bravely in speeches that she will not go into the war. We will, however, stay out of the war, in my judgment, if the men of Britain are supported to the utmost and immediately. This can only be done by the granting of enlarged powers to the President to deal not alone with the international situation but with the building of the materials and instruments of combat.
Republicans of 1941, you who gave to me the rarest privilege that could come to any man, the privilege of leading the greatest cause of this century in a great crusade—I call upon you now to rise to the opportunity of preserving the blessed principles of freedom and the preserving of the Republican party so that it may be an effective instrumentality in the solution of both our domestic and our international problems. If during this critical period we play a wise and proper part America in the near future will call us the truly gallant and brave defenders of America into power. Let us not fail.

URL: http://www.TeachingAmericanHistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=1603
 

Foreign Policy Concepts: Isolationism and Internationalism
http://www.resolutegroup.org/index.php?id=7:32:0
Since its founding, America has exhibited periods of both internationalism and isolationism, with the nation moving from positions of global involvement to virtual retrenchment. Why is this and what is the history behind it?

It is generally accepted that before America took her place as a great power, the US engaged in a fairly uniform policy of non-engagement, or isolationism. Thomas Paine sowed the earliest seeds of isolationism in his book, “Common Sense”. “It is in the interest of America to steer clear of Europe” he wrote. John Adams later declared that America “must separate ourselves from all European politics.” Finally, George Washington’s Farewell Address enshrined the policy for all time. From Washington, through Jefferson, to the Monroe Doctrine, there has been the underlying notion of isolationism in American political life. There were interactions and relations, but the US mainly remained removed from the internal affairs of Europe, a situation highlighted by the British-French War of the 1790’s. Too busy dealing with the domestic growth of the US and rebuilding the nation after the Civil War, 19th century American leaders chose to stay out of the European arena of power politics and the balance of power system.

In 1916 Isolationist sentiment was so strong that President Wilson had to tour the nation to defeat the non-interventionist in Congress, intent on stalling The National Defence Act. Following the War Americans remained isolationist: the horror of battle had not been intended as a prelude to permanent European involvement and the fighting had changed few minds. Indeed the movement gained more than a number of recruits following the carnage and isolationists were able to block American entry to the League of Nations. America moved to a period of political isolationism, but could not prevent the rest of the world carrying on without it. American investment in the outside world meant that America would be an international power regardless of individual political preferences. Even though America had rejected the League of Nations, by 1922 she had unofficial observers there. Despite the presence of American judges, the nation remained absent from the World Court, seen as too much of an extra-national authority by isolationists. Many pacts and treaties of neutrality were signed at this time, notably the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 that renounced the use of war as a means of effecting policy.


By 1932, the mood of the nation was such that Franklin Roosevelt had to publicly reject his Wilsonian attitudes towards internationalism to be elected President of the United States. By 1940, even with war raging in Europe, leading Americans remained isolationist. Most notable were Charles Lindbergh and Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Non-interventionist in the Congress forced the Neutrality Act of 1935 on President Roosevelt to prevent him from selling arms to Britain. They also supported a Constitutional amendment proposing a public referendum before any declaration of war. Such non-interventionist sentiment met with popular approval among the people of the United States. Since World War Two, America has embarked on a global foreign policy that committed it to involvement in every corner of the world. Isolationists however, were vocal critics of the Truman Doctrine of containment. The era of activism reached its peak in Vietnam, where defeat led to a resurgence of isolationism. Overall however, global activism has dominated American foreign policy since 1945.

Whilst isolationism has always played apart in American foreign policy, a penchant for internationalism has always been evident in American intervention in the political affairs of other nations. It is also evident in efforts to transplant American values around the globe. America has long seen herself as having a special mission in the world, viewing herself as innocent and virtuous in the midst of a tainted world. “The function of American policy is to mark other states up or down according to their obedience to our rules” wrote Professor Arthur Schlesinger. Indeed, according to Schlesinger, American isolationism does not involve American secession from the rest of the world. Its essence was the rejection of commitments to other states, to avoid ‘entangling alliances’ as Jefferson put it.

This dilemma has much to do with policy makers being unable to reconcile the benefits of withdrawing from the world with advantages of reforming it. Louis Hartz has written that America feels the need to “either withdraw from ‘alien’ things, or transform them; It cannot live in comfort by their side.” Whilst the debate between interventionists and isolationists has never been fully resolved, a cycle of behaviour appears to have emerged, with each policy taking a political generation to run its course. This is a prime example of what Arthur Schlesinger refers to as 'the cycles of American history." The first isolationist phase ended with Washington’s Farewell Address, leading to the early expansionist era that ended with the Monroe Doctrine. The next interventionist era occurred from the time of the Mexican War until the acquisition of Alaska in 1867. The First Word War dominated the next internationalist era, during which America became a world power. The inter- war period was a time of great isolationist sentiment, shaken off by the attack at Pearl Harbour.

As a political philosophy, Isolationism dictates that America serves its interests best by perfecting democracy at home, acting as a beacon for mankind. It also indicates that America’s values impose an obligation to crusade for them around the world, in search of a perfect future. Clearly these can be seen as particularly conservative traits. It is a pessimistic view of human nature and sees inequity between nations as an inevitable feature of international affairs. Foreigners are seen as threatening outsiders. The best way to deal with other nations is to avoid them. Both conservatives and isolationists are reluctant to become involved with others or to assume responsibility for them. They resist legislation that may interfere with a nation’s autonomy and are for the most part inhospitable to social change. The public embraces isolationist policies more enthusiastically than American leaders, and reports indicate that isolationist attitudes are most prevalent among the less educated segments of society.

With the end of the Cold War, the debate over isolationism and internationalism has resurfaced. In 1991, President George Bush used Wilsonian sounding principle to describe his vision of a new world order, dedicated to peace and security, freedom and the rule of law. Bush was such an internationalist that he has been accused of wanting to lead the world rather than just America. The end of the Cold War has resulted in the absence of a discernible threat as a central organising principle. Instead of a well-defined threat, America now faces uncertainty in which it must develop foreign policy. American leaders face unfamiliar foreign policy challenges in dealing with small states armed with weapons of mass destruction. There are also questions over future alliances. Allies and enemies can no longer be defined by their status in the Cold War and military planning must move beyond containment and the avoidance of nuclear war.

President Clinton has remained committed to American activism, claiming that America must "fulfil our responsibility as the world’s sole super-power." This however is not always the view of many in Congress. The view of many of the Republican majority is that there should be major cuts in foreign aid, restricted participation in UN operations, and the end of the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency. This view has been referred to as 'minimalist' by Haass, and favoured only by those who 'take a narrow view of US responsibility and obligations to meet challenges.' Clearly however, such calls do reflect the thoughts and opinions of some Americans, as personified by Pat Buchanan’s ‘America First’ movement and Ross Perot’s Fortress America references in 1992.

The Clinton Administration caused international concern in 1992 when it stated that the nation's domestic problems would require priority not only at home but also abroad. A series of speeches by top administration officials followed in September 1993 to alleviate fears that Clinton would be an isolationist Democrat, intent only on fixing the economy by protectionist methods. Rather, Clinton has proved to be an Internationalist like his predecessor, President Bush. Thus the Administration has emphasized free trade, open markets and the need to promote American 'competitiveness' in overseas markets. Whilst many of these objectives are consistent with an internationalist approach, the main aim of the Administration has been a return to growth and fuller employment in America. Whereas President Bush used foreign policy for its own end, Clinton has employed foreign policy to assist the domestic economy. The current Administration could not accept an isolationist agenda for it has used International policies to fuel the domestic agenda that was the bedrock of Clinton’s 1992 victory. As such Clinton’s foreign policy is closely linked to domestic economic principles. The GATT and NAFTA successes reveal a world view that domestic growth depends on foreign economic policy that promotes US exports and world trade. The goal clearly is to avoid the isolationist trade policies of the 1930s. When Britain’s inability to exercise leadership and America’s unwillingness to do so were primary causes of the Great Depression.

America is too entwined internationally with too many obligations and responsibilities to ever to be able to realise such a goal as isolationism, however the sentiment and the fear of involvement remain. The American actions in Bosnia are exemplary of this. Americans have been reluctant to send troops to help end the conflict and as a result the war has lasted for years. Only with the insurance’s of a definite pull out date have the troops actually gone over. One could put this down to the “Vietnam Syndrome” the US reluctance to involve itself in n unpopular war with the risk of high casualties with no definitive national interest. This can be seen as a form of isolationism.

America is now truly internationalist. The GATT deal has been ratified, the NAFTA deal pushed through. American envoys have brokered deals in Haiti, and Bosnia. Operation Vigilant Warrior has kept Kuwait free. Thus as America approaches the 21 century the issue remains the same; Should America be a global power or should it assume a less ambitious posture? Controversy over the answer is unlikely to end as reasonable people will asses the benefits and costs of intrusive Globalism. Current American duality is expressed by the President himself, declaring that “America cannot turn her back on the world” and yet at the same time stating that “America cannot be the world’s policeman”.

Isolationism and internationalism will continue to be important aspects within American foreign policy making. However, isolationism, although espoused by the minority, is less significant or important now, as explained, the US is now part of a global commitment. The US could not isolate itself even if it wanted to. Too much money has been invested abroad, as has too much foreign money and cultures been invested in the US. As technology improves and the barriers and boarders are weakened, the frontier continues to move outside the US boarders.
 
American Isolationism Before World War II
http://www.harwich.edu/depts/history/HHJ/iso.htm

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. – George Washington (U-S-History – Isolationism, par. 5)
Since the creation of this great country, a debate has raged back and forth whether to remain in a bubble on our separate continent from the rest of the world and to remain neutral, or to become involved in world affairs, and thus gain prestige, or destruction. Since World War II, the United States has increasingly “meddled” in the affairs of other nations, such as many Latin and South American countries, the Middle East, and Vietnam to name a few. Now, there is little of this non-intervention sentiment in the United States. Leading up to World War II, though, was the period of perhaps the greatest anti-war surge in the United States.
Isolationism, the term for this anti-war sentiment, was led by many congressmen and other influential people, such as the well-known Charles A. Lindbergh. They did not want America drawn into another World War, and so created the Neutrality Acts to punish warring nations. Roosevelt struggled greatly against Isolationism, but vowed to the American people that he would never send their sons into war, a promise that was soon broken. When England was under attack from the Germans, Roosevelt convinced the American people to push aside Isolationism and give the British greatly needed war materials under the Lend-Lease Act. When Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution fled to the United States on the S. S. St. Louis, they were rejected and sent back because of the United States’ 1924 immigration policy limiting immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe. The anti-war sentiments were nudged along by the Germans, who funded many congressmen to continue lobbying for Isolationist views. Isolationism in American influenced American policy in the late 1930s and early 1940s and greatly delayed its entry into World War II.
A great proponent of American Isolationism, and also a source of much criticism, was the famous aviator, Charles Lindbergh. One author even refers to part of the isolationism debate as “eleven moths of oratory between Franklin Roosevelt and Charles Lindbergh” (Berg 413) when Lindbergh had first joined the America First Committee. Lindbergh had his own views on America and the Germans. “[…] It seemed to me essential to France and England, and even to America, that Germany be maintained as a bulwark against the Soviet Union” (Berg 376). This prophetic view of American intervention fueled him to advocate an isolationist policy in America.
On September 11, 1941, Lindbergh spoke in Des Moines, Iowa, giving a lengthy speech urging the United States to not get involved in the War. He alluded to American debts from the First World War. “As you all know, we were left with the debts of the last European war; and unless we are more cautious in the future than we have been in the past, we will be left with the debts of the present case” (Ranfranz, par. 20). This is a reference back to the Nye Committee and its biased conclusions made about the U.S.’s involvement in World War I. He then accused the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration of being “the three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war” (Jenkins 127). If, he suggests, any one of these three groups ceases pushing for war, our country will be safe. “If any one of these groups—the British, the Jewish, or the administration—stops agitating for war, I believe there will be little danger of our involvement” (The History Channel, par. 1). He also accused them of plotting a means of forcing the U. S. into the war.
When hostilities commenced in Europe, in 1939, it was realized by these groups that the American people had no intention of entering the war […] They planned: first, to prepare the United States for foreign war under the guise of American defense; second, to involve us in the war, step by step, without our realization; third, to create a series of incidents which would force us into the actual conflict. (Ranfranz, par. 34)
Lindbergh denounced war propaganda for influencing the American population. “Our theaters soon became filled with plays portraying the glory of war. Newsreels lost all semblance of objectivity. Newspapers and magazines began to lose advertising if they carried anti-war articles” (Ranfranz, par. 36). He lamented the bigotry towards “individuals who opposed intervention”. Lindbergh then moved on to criticizing the Lend-Lease Act and the supposed “verge of war” it led the U. S. to. “First, we agreed to sell arms to Europe; next, we agreed to loan arms to Europe; then we agreed to patrol the ocean for Europe; then we occupied a European island in the war zone” (Ranfranz, par. 43). He then commented that it would be very difficult for America to be victorious in a war with Germany, stating that the German forces were “stronger than our own” (Ranfranz, par. 47). This controversial comment was met by many boos in the middle of a speech full of relatively nothing but cheers. This speech led to accusations of Lindbergh as an anti-Semite. Also, his name was removed from his hometown watertower in Little Falls, Minnesota (The History Channel, par. 2). This shows the great movement against isolationism and towards war among the American population nearing Pearl Harbor. Earlier, though, there was much less resistance against the isolationists in America.
During the spring of 1934, Fortune magazine published an article connecting European politics with the armaments industry. Then it discussed the activity of the American steel companies and the political ties in America. This article prompted a Senate investigation headed by Senators Pittman and Nye, a very isolationist Republican of North Dakota. The (incorrect) results of this investigation were that “American entry into the war was the work of wicked Wall Street bankers” (Perkins 96). In response to this thesis, Congress quickly began work on “neutrality legislation” (96) to prevent the U.S. from being drawn into another war. These laws became known as the Neutrality Acts. They “forbade American ships to sail into war zones or ports of belligerent nations, citizens to travel on merchant vessels belonging to belligerents, banks to lend money to nations at war, manufacturers to sell any armaments or other specified war-related products to warring countries” (Cooper 6). The most amazing part of these acts, though, was the proposed “Ludlow Amendment”. This amendment would allow the United States to go to war only after a national referendum. “The American people, faced perhaps by some instant danger, were supposed to debate the issue in every part of the land, expose their divisions to the possible enemy, and fracture their national unity in time of peril by sharp and perhaps bitter discussion” (Perkins 101). This obviously opinionated idea of the Ludlow Amendment gives a worst-case scenario showing how very flawed such an idea would be. Although this extreme measure could put the country in grave danger, seventy-five percent of the public was in favor of such an idea in 1935, and still sixty-eight percent in 1938 (102). “When the issue was brought to the floor of the House in [1938], it was clear that a great parliamentary battle impended. The President spoke out against the proposal; so, too did the Secretary of State” (102). In the House there were 209 votes for the amendment, and 188 votes against, not enough for the two-thirds vote required (102). It is very serious, though, how very divided the House was on this outrageous matter. It reflects how extremely distrustful the American people were of the President and how intense the anti-war sentiment was during that time period. Dexter Perkins describes this:
The Ludlow amendment represents the isolationist sentiment in its most extreme form. It was based on distrust of the executive on a conception of foreign policy which would have accentuated internal division and made effective action impossible, on that kind of fear of war which encourages others to war. It was the high-water mark of the movement of American withdrawal. (102)
The Neutrality Acts greatly hindered both the aggressor and the victim nations in war. Roosevelt made this connection and attempted to get Congress to allow loopholes in the act. “[Roosevelt] recommended the stepping-up of defense appropriations and expressed the opinion that the neutrality legislation of 1937 might operate unevenly, might ‘actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim’” (106). Basically, by cutting off support to both the aggressor and the victim, the victim would only grow weaker, while the aggressor would grow more powerful. Once World War II began, this proved to be the case for Nazi Germany and Britain. Britain was suffering much more greatly from the Neutrality Acts than Germany was. Roosevelt’s beliefs about these acts greatly reflect his general motives during his last two terms in the Whitehouse. He wanted to keep the isolationist American population happy while keeping the U. S. safe from foreign threats. He believed that “the country would be more likely to keep out of the war if the arms embargo were repealed. […] If the democratic nations could win, there was less chance of the United States being involved than if Germany were victorious” (108). He therefore “pursued a settled policy of weakening the Neutrality Acts” (Cooper 7) and helped out the Allied nations against the German aggressors.
This policy led to the creation of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, a great achievement of Roosevelt against the flow of isolationism, but first came a prelude in the summer of 1940 – the bases-destroyers deal. In this negotiation with Britain, America received many British bases “extending from Trinidad on the south to Newfoundland on the north” (Perkins 114). This ingenious idea was accepted by the isolationists because the bases would strengthen the U.S., but also greatly aided the British navy. “Almost half their destroyers had been damaged or demolished” (113). A year later, the situation was much worse and Britain was in serious need of armaments, but this time the isolationists were harder to persuade. Roosevelt, to sway the American people, made a comparison between Britain and a house burning down. “He made a parable about a man whose house was on fire and a neighbor who lent his garden hose – without demanding payment for it – in order to put out the fire” (Daniels 320). This comparison went over very well with the American people, and led him to continue this idea of aiding England. The American people now understood that the British “wanted materials, not men” (321). Isolationists, though, saw this idea as one step closer to war. According to the Chicago Tribune, the Lend-Lease bill would “destroy the Republic” (321). One Senator called it a “triple-A foreign policy: it will plough under every fourth American boy” (321). Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana claimed the bill was “a bill to enable the President to fight an undeclared war with Germany” (Grapes 37). The America First Committee was immediately against it, and Lindbergh drew great crowds to the Congressional Hearing for the bill (Daniels 321).
Even the former isolationist Republican candidate for president, Wendell Willkie supported the bill. In the Senate Caucus Room on February 11th, 1941, Willkie spoke in support of the Lend-Lease Act. “He proposed sending Britain all American bombers except those needed for training. He advocated a steady flow of more and more destroyers” (Daniels 322). In retaliation, Senator Nye quoted Willkie’s earlier statement towards Roosevelt, “on the basis of his post performance with pledges to the people, you may expect war by April, 1941, if he is elected” (323). After a long pause, Willkie shrugged and admitted, “It was a bit of campaign oratory” ruefully. A roar of laughter went up among the room, and “Nye and his like seemed swept aside in the applause. […] Isolationist righteousness was routed” (323). Soon after, the bill was signed into law.
Many opponents of the Lend-Lease Act, including Senator Wheeler of Montana realized that in order to send materials to the British across the Atlantic, armed convoys would be needed. “[…] American warships would have to be assigned convoy duty. That meant putting American ships and American lives in the line of fire and it increased the possibility of an armed exchange between German and U. S. naval forces” (Grapes 37). This point, did, in fact, become reality on September 4th, 1941. During this incident, the U. S. destroyer Greer exchanged fire with a German submarine (37-8). “A week later, on September 11, Roosevelt reacted to this attack in a speech in which he announced that he had given orders to the Navy to ‘shoot on sight’ and warned that Axis warships entering the American defense zone did so ‘at their peril’” (Shirer 882). More incidents like this occurred in coming months including two in October of 1941. On the 17th, the USS Kearny was torpedoed by the Germans, and eleven American sailors were killed when the U. S. destroyer Reuban James was torpedoed on the 31st. Following these attacks, “Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency” (Grapes 38) which many realized brought the U. S. very much closer to the joining the war than before.
The crowning “achievement” of isolationism was the incident of the S. S. St. Louis. On May 13, 1939, the S. S. St. Louis left Hamburg, Germany with 937 passengers (one account, by Bryan Grapes, claims the number to be 936 passengers, but 937 is more likely), 930 of whom were Jewish refugees (Wiaik 6). The ship’s destination was Havana, Cuba. Fourteen days later, though, when they arrived at Havana, the Cuban government had revoked their landing permits and they were unable to land. Instead, they sailed north to Florida where they waited off the coast of Miami, close enough to see the lights from the city at night. The U. S. government, with full knowledge of the persecution that had come to these people, and the plight they faced if forced to return, sent them away.
This incident reflects the United States’ unwillingness to become entangled in European affairs. The government could not admit the Jews into the country because of harsh immigration laws imposed in 1924 under the Coolidge administration. Although by some accounts, this harsh act was completely unnecessary and was a terrible example of American indifference to the plight of the Jews, others speak of it differently. According the Bryan Grapes, the American government greatly assisted the Jews in finding safe places to live, although not in the U. S. “None […] of the passengers of the St. Louis were returned to Nazi Germany. They were all resettled in democratic countries – 288 in the United Kingdom, and the rest in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark” (Grapes 211). What he fails to state is that four out of five of these countries mentioned were taken over by the Nazis within a few years. This incident is truly an error in judgement of the American government. An exception should have been made to keep hundreds of people from suffering at the hands of the Nazis.
The Germans put great effort into keeping America out of the war. They funded isolationist sentiments throughout the United States for a long period of time before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Germans not only saw the United States as a threat to join the war, but they also thought that if there was no chance whatsoever of U. S. entry, then England would finally give in to the Germans. Therefore, the Germans went to great lengths to keep the U. S. neutral. “In the United States the German Embassy, under the direction of Hans Thomsen, the chargé d’affaires, was spending every dollar it could lay its hands on to support the isolationists in keeping America out of the war and thus discourage Britain from continuing it” (Shirer 747). Thomsen put particular effort into the party conventions occurring in 1940. He tried influencing both parties to include anti-war planks, especially the Republicans (748). According to German papers captured after their defeat, a Republican Congressman was paid $3,000 “to invite fifty isolationist Republican Congressmen to the Republican convention ‘So that they may work on the delegates in favor of an isolationist foreign policy’” (748). This same individual also wanted $30,000 for full-page ads in American newspapers including one in the June 25th, 1940 New York Times (748). In this ad, many Democratic Senators spoke against Roosevelt and a recent change of cabinet officials. The advertisement begins, “The Democratic Party, we believe, is the interventionist and war party and is rushing us headlong into war in efforts to quarantine and police the world with American blood and treasure” (New York Times 19). This is a reference to Roosevelt’s 1937 “Quarantine” speech, in the Midwest, where he “urged peaceful countries to unite and ‘quarantine’ international lawlessness” (U-S-History - Roosevelt, par. 8). Senator Johnson of Colorado goes on to give his opinion that “[…] If the democratic Party fails to do its duty and makes the mistake of nominating an interventionist for the office of President, so far as I am concerned, my country will come before my Party” (New York Times 19). This quote insinuates that the Democratic party, by renominating Roosevelt, is unpatriotic and will be ruining the United States, a very harsh jab at the Democrats, by a Democrat isolationist. Another Senator quoted in this German-funded isolationist advertisement is Senator Walsh of Massachusetts, another Democrat isolationist. He accuses the Roosevelt administration of not thinking of the poor or the majority of the American public, and of charging into war.
[…] Oh, the tragedy of it, that a powerful group of men of property should be challenging the peace desires of the millions of poor people who toil and labor and sacrifice to whom war brings more poverty, whose children are made for generations to eat the bread of poverty of war (19).
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts, and Senator Joe Kennedy, also of Massachusetts, although being Democrats, were very influential isolationists. This lack of sympathy towards Great Britain probably stems from their Irish backgrounds.
These Senators were bribed into making statements betraying their parties, their countries, and themselves. The German attempts to push the Presidency to Willkie failed, thankfully, and Roosevelt was able to bring about his ideas of Lend-Lease, to which Willkie joined in. There was still a large group of the United States population that was isolationist, though, right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor.
After World War I, the people of the victor nations were exhausted by the war. This tiredness of war led to a great aversion for the war by the people of Britain, France, and the United States. Among these countries “sentiments among politicians and the public turned rapidly and decisively in an anti-interventionist direction” (Cooper 5). In Britain and France, this attitude became known as appeasement. In America, it was called Isolationism. This shift in attitudes led to many new laws proclaiming the United States’ neutrality in the world. “Starting with the Senate’s surprise rejection of membership in the World Court in 1934 – which had previously been pushed by Republican presidents as well as now by the Democratic president, Franklin Roosevelt – both houses of Congress swung overwhelmingly isolationist” (6). From 1934 on, isolationism grew steadily stronger with the creation of the Neutrality Acts, one after another, in 1935, ’36, and ’37. Some historians believe isolationism was extreme throughout the late 30s because “The American people did not as yet feel insecure. It was when fear was added to moral condemnation that their temper began to change and that in increasing measure they began to feel that they might be compelled in their own interest, to combat the advance of totalitarianism” (Perkins 105). This opinion of isolationism as an idea that only thrives during times of safety is completely true. Even today, the American people feel safe, so a great percent of the population feels no need to be at war with Iraq. That is how the human mind works, and how it will continue to work in times of peace.
Although it seemed to make sense at the time that the U. S. would be safe as long as it stayed out of the war, there is a moral dilemma that must be confronted. This dilemma, whether to help those in need, was brought to the spotlight during the S. S. St. Louis incident, America made the wrong choice and turned away 937 people in need of shelter and protection. The question is, when is it more important to protect the people of your fellow nations at your own nation’s expense? This debate has continued ever since George Washington’s famous farewell address denouncing foreign “entanglements”. These “entanglements” are what keep a nation alive and thriving in the world, and must be maintained to some degree. Franklin Roosevelt realized that one day we must go to Germany, whether the American people are in favor of it or not. He, therefore, tried to get America involved as quickly as possible, against the will of his apathetic nation. Roosevelt said, wisely, “We must be the arsenal of democracy” (Daniels 321). This was true only until Japan attacked our men at Pearl Harbor and killed isolationism in America. This attack destroyed America’s false sense of security and turned us into much more than the arsenal of democracy. We became the juggernaut of the free people of the world; ready to help all the people we turned away for years. We repented for our American Isolationism.